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Constitutional Patriation 
as prologue: phase two constitution-making 
and reform of federal institutions 
Edward MCWHINNEY * 
L'auteur évalue l'opération de rapatriement de la Constitution du Canada 
entreprise de 1980 à 1982. Il juge qu'elle fut un exercice imparfait ou, du moins, 
incomplet. Il se demande si la phase deux de l'élaboration de la Constitution se 
concrétisera. 
For numbers of reasons, it may be suggested that the recent Canadian 
constitutional « patriation» project, over the period 1980-82, was a flawed, 
or at least incomplete, exercise in constitution-making.1 It did, to be sure, 
remove some historical anachronisms, — albeitly belatedly and long after 
the movement of historical events had reduced the Imperial (British) rôle to a 
purely honorific or symbolic one. The old, Imperial (British) Grundnorm 
was, in effect, replaced in 1982 by a Canadian one ; though what Prime 
Minister Trudeau called the « cutting of the Imperial Gordian Knot » had 
already been consummated in legal terms as early as the two Imperial 
Conferences of 1926 and 1930 and recognised, as such, by the British 
themselves in the Statute of Westminster of 1931.2 And the substitution of a 
wholly Canadian constitutional amending process for the old, Imperial 
« made-in-Britain » machinery of a statute of the British Parliament enacted, 
* Professeur, Université Simon Fraser. 
1. Discussed, more fully, in the author's recent constitutional trilogy : Quebec and the 
Constitution, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1979; Constitution-Making, Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 1981 ; Canada and the Constitution, Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 1982. 
2. See, generally, I. JENNINGS, «The Statute of Westminster and Appeals to the Privy 
Council», (1936) 52 Law Quarterly Review 173; R.T.E. LATHAM, «The Law and the 
Commonwealth », in W.K. Hancock (éd.) Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, (1937), 
vol. 1, p. 533 ; and see also the present author's « "Sovereignty" in the United Kingdom and 
the Commonwealth Countries at the present day», (1953) 68 Political Science Quarterly 
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in modem times, at the request and to the letter of the advice of the 
Canadian (federal) Government, merely did away with a vestigial survival 
from Imperial time past in which as British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, with cool political realism, recognised during the Canadian-
British pre-patriation negotiations,3 the rôle of the British could be no more 
than purely formal and absolutely non-discretionary. The new Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms was, pershaps, another matter, constitu-
tionally entrenched as it was in contrast to the earlier, purely statutory, 
Diefenbaker Bill of Rights of 1960. But, even here, since the actual 
substantive law contents of the new Charter were somewhat more modest 
and conventional than Prime Minister Trudeau and his advisers might 
privately have hoped, or publicly admitted after the event, the major change 
and impact is likely to be political-psychological in character. It should help 
to complete the shattering of the « classical », Imperial British and Common 
Law, constitutional-legal mind-set in which the higher judiciary in Canada 
have substantially operated since 1867. It should also, for better or for 
worse, speed up that process of « reception », already evident before World 
War II, of American legal thought-ways and substantive constitutional-legal 
ideas4 and, in particular the special institutional conception of a broadly 
legislating, policy-making Supreme Court both filling the gaps in existing 
law and also moving boldly to chart out new legal frontiers in response to 
new societal problems. Curiously enough, the enactment of the new Canadian 
Charter of Rights seems to have been ventured upon with very little advance 
consideration of the possible impact of a Court-based, Charter of Rights 
jurisprudence upon other institutions of federal Government, coordinate 
with the Court, and their own specialised constitutional rôles and missions, 
and also of the practical political consequences for traditional concepts of 
judicial independence and for the judicial appointing power and even claims 
to judicial tenure. These problems must now be faced after the event and 
appropriate constitutional remedies or counterweights devised, if the Supreme 
Court at least is to be spared embarrassing public attacks and criticism in the 
more overtly political arenas of government. 
In one other major respect, the constitutional « patriation » project must 
also be considered as, at best, inchoate in character. It does not really 
address itself to the needs for constitutional up-dating and modernisation 
3. Canada and the Constitution, supra, note 1, pp. x—xi, 68-9, 72-4, 90, 117, 125-6, 133. 
4. As to the changing trends and emphasis in legal education in Canada and the « reception », 
post-War, of American constitutional and general legal ideas, in displacement of British 
ones, see <• Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law in Canada», in E. MCWHINNEY (ed.), 
Canadian Jurisprudence. The Civil Law and Common Law in Canada, Toronto, Carswell, 
1958, p. 1. 
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that are being faced by all other Western, or « received »-Western, constitu-
tional systems today, some of these with relatively ancient constitutions and 
others with charters adopted as recently as the post-World War II wave of 
constitution-making.5 It is increasingly evident that the constitutional insti-
tutions and processes inherited from yesterday are not always attuned to the 
complex, multi-faceted decision-making of the contemporary post-industrial 
society, and that they may, at times, be a positive obstacle to rational 
community problem-solving. We need to rethink our federal institutions, 
and to devise new concepts of constitutional countervailing power, and 
institutionalised checks and balances. 
For reasons canvassed elsewhere,6 it may be suggested that the times 
were not especially ripe for constitution-making and general acts of consti-
tuent power, in Canada and other Western societies, at the close of the 
decade of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. It was a period of doubt, 
with forewarning of decline and decay. An era of economic growth and some 
public confidence and optimism for the future, had clearly come to an end in 
the West, without any significant new societal consensus having emerged as 
to new, realisable community goals and directions for the era of transition 
that would follow — in Canada, not less than in the World Community as a 
whole. One of the historical curiosities in the Canadian «patriation» 
exercise of 1980-2 was that in seeking to profit from one of those rare 
moments in any nation's history favourable to ambitious new constitutional 
projects — the public euphoria (in English-speaking Canada) resulting from 
the clear defeat of Premier Lévesque's « sovereignty-association » proposal 
in the Quebec referendum of May, 1980, and the consensus (among English-
speaking Canadians) on the need to do something, in gratitude and 
compensation, for Quebec and French-Canada — the federal Government 
directed itself only marginally, and in passing, to the constitutional impera-
tives as to preservation of the French language and French culture and the 
historical duality of Canada itself, flowing from the preceding two decades 
of « Quiet Revolution» in Quebec. Indeed, and in so far as it touched on 
special Quebec issues, the federal Government's « patriation » project did so 
in ways not always seemingly congruent with Quebec opinion as expressed in 
the two great French Language Charters of two successive Quebec Govern-
ments of opposing political ideology — the Bourassa Government's Bill 22 
of 1974 and Lévesque Government's Bill 101 of 1977.7 
5. Constitution-Making, supra, note 1, pp. 12 et seq. 
6. Ibid. ; and see, also, « The vocation of our age for law-making : constitutional and 
international codification in an era of transition and rapid change», in A.R. BLACKSHIELD 
(ed.), Legal Change. Essays in Honour of Julius Stone, 1983, pp. 241 et seq. 
1. Quebec and the Constitution, supra, note 1, pp. 56 et seq. 
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The new constitutional ideas in Canada since 1960 are largely Quebec 
derived or Quebec inspired, — from French-Canadian jurists and politico-
logues and political leaders, in Quebec City or in Ottawa. Such Anglo-
Canadian thinking on constitutional change as there has been, has tended to 
be purely reactive in character — a delayed and usually only partial and 
limited response to original Quebec proposals, advanced either by Quebec 
Provincial political and intellectual leaders within Quebec itself, or by 
Quebec federalist political leaders within the federal Government in Ottawa. 
Such Anglo-Canadian responses have tended to occur some time after the 
event, and often too late to be effective or relevant in constitutional problem-
solving. The federalist impulse within the more generalised Quebec intellec-
tual Risorgimento is now associated, in its origins, with the then Professor 
Trudeau and the group of young intellectuals he assembled under the Cité 
Libre banner in Montreal,8 and found its practical outlets, ultimately, in the 
pursuit of French-Canadian power within the Canadian Government itself; 
the establishment of a significant and continuing French presence within the 
federal Cabinet and the federal bureaucracy; and the consolidation and, 
where need be, implantation of the French fact throughout Canada through 
the constitutionalisation of French-English bilingualism within the federal 
Government, and, more generally, as a citizen's right to receive federal 
services in either Official Language, French or English, at choice, throughout 
Canada. The other parallel and not necessarily conflicting, impulse within 
the Quebec intellectual Risorgimento, was particularist rather than federalist, 
and found its outlet in interesting proposals for institutional reform within 
Canadian federalism to produce, henceforward, a special Quebec institutional 
weighting or bias. In the first, and intellectually most creative decade of 
Quebec's « Quiet Revolution», in the 1960s, and under the rubric of« special 
constitutional status » for Quebec, a group of young Quebec thinkers — 
Jacques-Yvan Morin, Claude Morin, Léon Dion, Gérard Bergeron, and 
others9 — separately and severally, and with very little apparent direct 
contact or exchanges of ideas, put forward concrete proposals for reconsti-
tuting or reordering existing federal institutions, like the Senate and the 
Supreme Court. Such proposals were, of course, linked to the embryonic 
Quebec case for a « special constitutional status » for Quebec within the 
Canadian federal system, more or less reflecting the special historical, deux 
Nations conception of Confederation. In so far as constitutional dualism has 
presumably received, for the time being at least, a constitutional quietus with 
8. P.E. TRUDEAU, Le fédéralisme et la société canadienne-française, Montréal, Éditions 
H.M.H., 1967. 
9. Quebec and the Constitution, supra, note 1, pp. 21 et seq. 
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the Supreme Court decision of December, 1982,'° and subsequent Quebec 
Government public statements," then no doubt those same, special consti-
tutional, dualistic elements, can now also be divorced from the original 
proposals for constitutional reform, leaving remaining the larger issues of 
the testing of antique constitutional institutions and processes, inherited 
from 1867, by the dry light of empirically-based reason and the consti-
tutionally more enlightened standards of contemporary legal science. 
Can, for example, purely appointive legislative chambers, like our 
federal Senate, maintain any claims to constitutional legitimacy in an era of 
representative, participatory democracy? n 
Can Courts intervene to rule on great policital causes célèbres that will 
normally be resolved, one way or another, through the ordinary political 
processes and in the ordinary political (executive-legislative, inter-govern-
mental) arenas, and expect to retain traditional claims to judicial inde-
pendence and to freedom from partisan political criticism, and to non-
answerability, politically, to the directly-elected (executive-legislative) insti-
tutions of government?13 It may be suggested, in this regard, that in the 
Quebec Veto case, the Supreme Court of Canada, in its judgment rendered 
in December, 1982, seemed unduly anxious to give a ruling, (though the 
issue, such as it was, had already become moot and non-justiciable by the 
standards that most Supreme Courts, in most countries, apply) ; M and that, 
on the legalised abortion issue, the Supreme Court conceded standing-to-sue 
to a middle-aged, male litigant who would have found himself barred, in 
almost every other comparable Supreme Court jurisdiction, as having no 
sufficient constitutional «interest».15 More judicial self-restraint in relation 
to great public-political issues where Angels, (and other Supreme Courts 
with more accumulated experiences with judicial legislation and judicial 
policy-making), would prudently choose not to tread, might help to palliate 
the problem ; but the Supreme Court's own seeming eagerness to get 
involved in these issues will undoubtedly bring the matter to a head. An 
10. Re A.-G. Que. and A.-G. Canada, (1982) 140 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C. Can.). 
11. B. DESCÔTEAUX, «Pour René Lévesque, La fin de 115 ans d'illusions», Le Devoir 
(Montreal), December 7, 1982. 
12. See, generally, Reform of the Senate, a Discussion Paper (Government of Canada, Hon. 
Mark MacGuigan, Minister of Justice, June, 1983). 
13. See, generally, the author's Judicial Review, 4lh ed., 1969; W.R. LEDERMAN, «The 
Independence of the Judiciary», in Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas 1981, 
pp. 109 et seq. 
14. (1982) 140 D.L.R. (3d) 385. 
15. Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on the preliminary, jurisdictional issue only, 
conceding constitutional standing-to-sue on the abortion issue to one, Joseph Borowski, 
December 1, 1981. 
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interesting range of alternative institutional-processual reform options, 
involving the Court, is available for Phase Two Constitution-Making, if and 
when it is properly entered upon. 
Are the times, however, any more ripe now than they were in the period 
1980-2 for fundamental reform, federal institutional or otherwise? One has 
the impression that the question of constitutional reform, if it ever were a 
popular concern, has become displaced by basic issues of economic survival ; 
and in any case the new constitutional amending-machinery — the « all-
Canadian » process — established under the Canada Act and the Constitution 
Act of 1982 is likely to prove cumbersome and difficult to operate, even in 
regard to politically non-controversial matters ; and rigid and unyielding in 
regard to the really urgent and necessary reform projects. The final 
elimination from the federal constitutional « patriation » project of the 
recourse to participatory democracy and the constitutional remedy of a 
popular referendum vote, to resolve deadlocks in the new amending 
process,16 conferred too much negative, frustrating power on reluctant, and 
on the whole constitutionally backward-looking, Provincial Premiers. We 
may thus have placed ourselves into a constitutional straight-jacket for the 
future, with the constitutionalist's skills perforce directed to informal, 
indirect modes of change not involving recourse to the oligarchic, inter-
Governmental process envisaged under the Constitution Act, 1982. The 
opportunities here, however, remain considerable, granted sufficient consti-
tutional wit and imagination ; and some of the recent, more revolutionary 
proposals, — for rationalising and stream-lining and modernising executive-
legislative relations at the federal level, for example — would appear to fall 
wholly within federal constitutional amending power and thus involve 
federal constituent powers alone. For these matters — touched on, in part, 
by the House of Commons Special Committee on Standing Orders and 
Procedure (Lefebvre Committee),17 the constitutional initiative rests with the 
16. The federal Government opening to participatory democracy via the referendum route to 
constitutional amendment, was made in s. 47 of the second (so-called Consolidated) version 
of the proposed constitutional patriation Resolution, tabled in the House of Commons on 
February 13, 1981 and approved by both federal Houses in April, 1981. The popular 
referendum escape-route from federal-Provincial deadlocks over proposed constitutional 
amendments was, however, deleted once and for all from the patriation package after the 
federal-Provincial heads-of-government political compromise deal of November 5, 1981 : it 
appeared neither in the third version of the patriation Resolution nor in the fourth, final 
version adopted by the federal Parliament and formally enacted by the British Parliament 
and proclaimed as law in Canada on April 17, 1982: Canada and the Constitution, supra, 
note 1, pp. 149, 167, 172. 
17. See, generally. House ol Commons, Special Committee on Standing Orders and Procedure, 
Third Report to the House (First Session of the Thirty-Second Parliament, 1980-81-82), 
Issue No. 7, November 4, 1982; ibid.. No. 8, November 9, 1982; ibid., No. 12, December 7, 
1982. 
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federal Government, and it needs only civil courage on its part to move, with 
resulting far-reaching reform and up-dating in our federal institutions and 
federal decision-making. In other areas — Senate reform, for example, 
designed to bring the federal upper house in line with all major trends in 
democratic constitutionalism by replacing a purely executive-appointed 
body by a popularly elected one, — a major constitutional impediment to 
change was created, unexpectedly perhaps, by the Supreme Court's intel-
lectually somewhat unpersuasive per curiam ruling of December, 1979,18 
rendered under the unusual and difficult circumstances for a collégial 
decision-making body created by the Chief Justice's prolonged absence 
through illness immediately after the oral argument in the matter had been 
completed.19 The problem will either have to be faced head on, and a fresh 
Supreme Court ruling sought, on a far more substantial and empirically-
based record, on the same issue, or else the federal Government will have to 
grit its teeth and actually use the complex, oligarchic, inter-governmental, 
consensual process enjoined henceforth, under the Constitution Act, 1982, 
for reform and modernisation of antique federal Governmental institutions 
and procedures. The cause of fundamental constitution novation is too 
important, however, to be abandoned through counsels of despair resulting 
from the constitutional strait-jacket effectively created, in many areas of 
constituent power, by the new, autonomous, all-Canadian constitutional 
amending machinery created as part of the constitutional patriation package 
of 1980-1982. 
18. Reference re Legislative Authority of Parliament to Alter or Replace the Senate, (1980) 102 
D.L.R. (3d) 1. 
19. See, generally, Canada and the Constitution, supra, note 1, pp. 16-21. 
